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Abstract:

In the process of formulating the General Provisions of the Civil Law of P. R.
China, the attribute of virtual property rights has changed from real rights to
non-real rights. Article No. 127 thereof does not clarify the nature of virtual
property rights after all, and the place where virtual property is put in the “Civil
Rights” chapter of General Provisions of the Civil Law makes the concept
even more complex and confusing. The “relationships paradigm” protection
of virtual property does not have a definite classification criterion, nor stands
opposite to the “rights paradigm.” There are two different ways to justify
the “theory of virtual property as a real right” under the “rights paradigm”
protection, namely, essentialism and consequentialism. The former resulted
from utilizing features in a demonstration and identifying disposal rights
with real rights, while the latter resulted from adherence to the dichotomy
system of property rights comprising real rights and creditor’s rights. From
the perspective of larceny in Criminal Law and virtual property insurance in
The Social Insurance Law, the attribute of virtual property rights is irrelevant
to creditor’s rights. The attribute of virtual property rights shall be defined as
virtual property rights so that it can be included in the system of civil rights.
The uniqueness of virtual property is enough to become an object of emerging
civil rights; intangible property rights as a superordinate theoretical concept
cannot reflect the essence of virtual property rights. The legislative frame
of virtual property rights shall be comprised of the subject, object, exercise,
publication and change of the rights.
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T

he provisions on virtual property in Article No. 127 of the General Provisions of the Civil Law of
China (The provisions on the protection of data or network virtual properties shall be abided by.) has
been praised by scholars for “adapting to the demands of the ‘Internet +’ development,”① “adapting to the
demands of the Internet and big data development,”② and displaying “creativity and distinct features.”③ But
the provision on virtual property in the General Provisions of the Civil Law is too simple and lacks operability,
and only a leading norm is used to protect virtual property according to the “laws with relevant provisions.”
Since relevant legal provisions are not in place at present, virtual property protection stays in the current
conditions. Meanwhile, such simple provisions in the General Provisions of the Civil Law keep the nature
of virtual property a pending issue. In the process of formulating the General Provisions of the Civil Law,
the attribute of virtual property rights has been given definitions varying from real rights to non-real rights,
making it difficult to determine its nature. Article No. 104 in the General Provisions of the Civil Law (first
draft) deliberated by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in June 2016 stipulates that
property “includes real estate (immovable property) and movable property. In case other laws also stipulate
certain rights to be the objects of real rights, those provisions shall be followed.” But since there are debates
on the attributes of virtual property rights, which are defined as a real right, among the theory and practice
fields in the process of seeking opinions, ④ “virtual property” has been segregated from that article in the
second and third deliberations and the formal draft, and defined separately in such a way, “Where any laws
provide for the protection of data and network virtual property, such laws shall apply.” Although this article
stipulates the protection of virtual property, the legal nature thereof is described vaguely, making the nature
of virtual property complex and confusing. Does the legislative body believe that virtual property rights are
not real rights, or that real rights theory is not perfected enough to define virtual property rights, and therefore
an evasive legislative technique was used to treat its nature? As China does not have a tradition of publishing
legislative reasons, we are unable to ascertain the answer. In addition, the ordinal position of virtual property
in the General Provisions of the Civil Law also makes its nature elusive. Virtual property is defined in the “Civil
Rights” chapter of the General Provisions of the Civil Law and listed behind the provisions related to personal
and property rights. Article No. 126 is a miscellaneous provision, reading, “The civil subjects enjoy other civil
rights and interests as prescribed by law,” followed by Article No. 127 making a provision regarding virtual
property. Why does the law not stipulate virtual property in Article No. 126, the catch-all provision? Due to
virtual property not being prescribed in the provision on property rights, does that mean the legislative body
refuses to recognize the characteristics of virtual property as property rights? Moreover, the unclear nature
of virtual property rights leading to Article No. 127 of the General Provisions of the Civil Law will bring no
benefits to juridical practice. Since the provision does not clarify the nature of virtual property rights, it cannot
eliminate the coexistence of default and tort causes in the similar cases previously put on record by all local
courts. This leads to a situation where Contract Law and Tort Law can apply separately, and different results of
judgments might be produced for the same types of cases. Finally, if it is an intended elusion for the legislative

① This is an opinion held by Prof. Long Weiqiu. Wang Yuan et. al. (2017, March, 22). General provisions of the Civil Law: Standing fast between inheritance and
innovation. The Procuratorial Daily.
② Meng, 2017, March 22
③ Zhang, 2017, March 22
④ Summary of seminar on legislative protection of network virtual property in Civil Code. Retrieved from http://www.civi1law.com.cnllw/ 1I?id=31564.
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body to vaguely describe the nature of virtual property rights and leave room for subsequent legislation, then
the nature of virtual property rights remains an inevitable problem.
Though the academic circle has completed a great deal of research regarding the nature of virtual property
rights, a consensus has not yet been reached. By evaluating and analyzing the existing academic work, the
author hopes to provide theoretical support for subsequent legislation.

1. Protection path of virtual property under the “relationships paradigm” and its
criticism
1.1 Main viewpoints on the protection of virtual property under the “relationships paradigm”
Presently, the discussion of virtual property rules by the academic circle is mainly focused on whether
virtual property constitutes a civil right and what type of right it belongs to. This research is a continuation
of the traditional construction mode of rights in the civil code of civil law system, which can be termed
as the protection path of the “rights paradigm.” But apart from such a protection path, some scholars have
invented a new way by proposing a protection path for virtual property under the “relationships paradigm.”①
The proposers of the “relationships paradigm” believe that depending on the differences between the “free”
distribution and “forced” distribution of legal disputes, the rules of civil law can be classified into the “rights
paradigm” and the “relationships paradigm.” The so-called “rights paradigm” refers to the construction of
rights that enables a civil subject to enjoy the rights and thereby enforce behaviors on other civil subjects. The
so-called “relationships paradigm” refers to “the construction of rules that are directly concerned with the
relationship between the subjects of civil legal disputes, and the forced relationship distribution between civil
subjects under specific behaviors or conditions is described by use of a ‘condition-consequences’ expression
approach.”② The concept of virtual property rights does not appear in the Civil Code, and the interests of
virtual property can be realized through the network services protocols between the network operators and
users and the Tort Liability Law according to specific legal relationships. The “relationships paradigm” is
based on the premise of maintaining the existing Pandekten rights system to manage the virtual property
interests in accordance with Contract Law or Tort Law, depending on the different legal relationships involved,
and thus deny the dominance of virtual property rights.
Such an opinion disregards the current social situation of growing virtual property, and manages the
virtual property interests respectively according to the legal relationship involved. It does not attach a legal
position to virtual property but tries to resolve interest disputes through legal interpretation or analogy. It
seemingly brings forward a different innovative idea by setting rules on virtual property but must be carefully
reviewed.
1.2 Criticism on the protection of virtual property under the “relationships paradigm”
No standard has been set for the classification of the two protection paths, i.e. “rights paradigm” and
“relationships paradigm.” Standard is the basis of classification, without which the classification and its
demonstration are not academically persuasive. “Rights paradigm” does enable a civil subject to enforce other

① Shen, 2016.
② Ibid.
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civil subjects in performing behaviors by enjoying its rights, but the statement saying that “the rules of real
and personal rights are the product of the typical rights paradigm”① cannot cover all types of rights. In fact,
the rules for creditor’s rights can also be included in the scope of the “rights paradigm.” After the stipulation
of creditor’s rights, the creditor can also enforce the compulsory behavior of the debtor, and the creditor’s
competence and rights constitute the basis. Meanwhile, real and personal rights shall be constructed not only
as objective rights in the relationships formed through disputes, but also by the “conditions-consequences”
expression approach in the benefit distribution relationships. In addition, it is difficult to wholly include the
right of personality in the scope of the “rights paradigm” or the “relationships paradigm.” In contrast with real
rights, the right of personality does not have a clear and definite boundary, making it hard to define its power
and functions, and causing the inadequate basis for the subject of rights enforcing other subjects to perform
duties.
The next noteworthy point is that the “rights paradigm” and the “relationships paradigm” are not in
opposition to each other. No matter whether the norms are designed as per the “rights paradigm,” disputes
must be resolved as per the “relationships paradigm.” For instance, for real rights, personal rights and
intellectual property rights, though their connotation and scope are clarified by legislation, and the obligee
can exercise the rights within the legal limits, once any right is infringed, the “conditions-consequences”
expression is still used to apply for subsequent remedies. Similarly, for the creditor’s rights as a model
applicable to the “relationships paradigm,” the creditor who fails to exercise the rights as per the right of claim
still needs to apply for remedies for interests according to the expression of “conditions-consequences.” In
addition, for the typical rights of the “rights paradigm” such as intellectual property rights and personal rights,
there is also no such thing as rights being exercised as per their legal connotations in general. The subject of
copyright as the rights of publication, authorship and maintaining integrity of a work may claim the rights
as per the “relationships paradigm” only after specific powers and functions are infringed, and conduct
benefit distributions according to the rules of compensation for damages. More obviously, since punishment
is impossible, the subject of personal rights can only request responsibility determination according to the
Tort Liability Law when its rights are infringed, and then benefits will be distributed as per the “relationships
paradigm.” As a result, the two paradigms are not contradictory but indispensable to each other, and the “object
tool (rights) outside the relationships between civil subjects” does not exist.② No rights can break away from
relationships. Even self-exercising of real rights also involves the exclusive relationship between the obligee
and the third party, and this depends on how we limit and explain the scope of the word “relationship.”
The third noteworthy point is that the classification of the “rights paradigm” and the “relationships
paradigm” originates from the different viewing angles of absolute rights and relative rights. Legal rights
such as real rights and intellectual property rights have clear connotations and can be freely exercised by the
obligee within the statutory authority. If the rights are not exercised beyond the boundary, then the process
will not involve anyone else or create any legal relationship. In case rights are exercised in multiple forms,
such as income of real rights, transfer of intellectual property rights or infringement of rights, the relationships
paradigm then plays its role by applying the contractual relationships and tort relationships related to creditor’s

① Ibid.
② Ibid.
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rights. The proposer of the “relationships paradigm” tries to discard the traditional “rights paradigm” and
include virtual property into the protection scope of the “relationships paradigm.” Such an innovative
paradigm is not advisable.

2. Criticism on the “theory of virtual property as a real right” under the
protection of the “rights paradigm”
2.1 Criticism on the “theory of virtual property as a real right” under the approach of essentialism
2.1.1 The “theory of virtual property as a real right” under the approach of essentialism has resulted from
utilizing features in demonstrations.
Logically, “theory of virtual property as a real right” is to judge whether virtual property belongs to
property from the perspective of property features. If yes, then virtual property rights shall be defined as
a real right; otherwise we need to search for cognitive standards of other natures. But to make the theory
logically possible, one precondition is required, i.e., a definite judgment standard. Although property features
are not explicitly stipulated in legislation, the theory is still worth taking as a reference. But the problem
is that it might be arbitrary to judge whether virtual property constitutes property as per a theory. Since
scholars often select judgment standards from the perspective conductive to proving their own opinions, the
conclusions naturally come down to the “property” preset by scholars. Property’s corporeality is the most
important standard for judgments of property, but scholars often avoid the crucial point in demonstration by
not mentioning the bodiless feature of virtual property but demonstrating its specificality and independence.
For instance, some scholars believe that “network users can set a password for their account to keep others
from editing, adding or deleting their data, and can trade, use or consume virtual property through certain
programs, or determine its value depending on market supply and demand. Network operators can also
safekeep virtual property as per protocols to endow it with identity during effective operation, indicating that
network virtual property possesses specificality in general social or economic concepts. The independence of
‘property’ possessed by network virtual property is manifested in such a way that although virtual property
must be technically dependent on a specific network platform for existence, the property's independence
does not just refer to physical independence. Virtual property is differentiated from network platforms and
other users’ network resources by technical means. What is particularly important is that in the general social
concept and transaction concept of virtual property in particular, virtual property is treated as an independent
‘property’ with its value independent of real property.”① In my opinion, the discussion of the specificality has
a premise, that is, virtual property is a type of “property,” or such specificity is meaningless. The greatest
weakness of this theory lies in its failure to demonstrate the fundamental standards of judgments for property,
i.e., an object’s corporeality; instead, it directly affirms the specificality of virtual property which is a “bodiless
property.” This neglects the important issue in favor of trivialities. Property Law is built on tangible property,
with movable and immovable properties as the major forms of property. Although rights can also be objects
regulated by Property Law under legal conditions, the latter cannot be identified with properties themselves.

① Summary of seminar on legislative protection of network virtual property in Civil Code. Retrieved from http://www.civi1law.com.cnllw/ 1I?id=31564.
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Those which can be regulated by Property Law are not necessarily a type of property; even if regulated by
property law, virtual property is not necessarily identified as property. Furthermore, identifying virtual property
as property due to its independence also involves logical problems such as prejudice by first impression or
circular argument. The standard of independence is only valuable to property. It is meaningless to discuss
independence before demonstrating that virtual property is a type of property with corporeality. Independence
is a standard used for distinguishing property from its components and judging whether property is under
independent ownership, with property as its logical premise. Without being property, there is certainly no need
for demonstrating independence.
2.1.2 The “theory of virtual property as a real right” under the approach of essentialism has resulted from
mistaking rights of property dominion for real rights.
Identifying disposal rights with real rights is another logical mistake in the “theory of virtual property as a
real right.” The demonstration strategy adopted in the “theory of virtual property as a real right” is that virtual
property possesses dominant traits, so virtual property is a real right. For instance, when demonstrating
the attributes of an online store as a real right, some scholars first argued that the dominant trait of rights is
the mark discriminating real rights from creditor’s rights, and then demonstrated the owner's dominance
over the online store in detail, as manifested by the online store owner enjoying the exclusive autonomous
management right and independent disposing right over the virtual space.① This demonstration method
contains a significant logical fallacy as it equates disposal rights with real rights. Fruitful results have been
obtained in the research of the relationships between real rights and proposal rights, which can be described
as follows. The concept of disposal rights is indeed derived from the right in rem, but the dominant trait of the
right in rem has later been highlighted by the interpretive model of subjective rights under the control of will.
With the development of the Pandekten system, disposal rights can thereby be separated from and then be
independent of real rights, becoming a concept under a rights expression standard different from real rights.②
Furthermore, the typical model of disposal rights is shown as control of will between “subject - object.” The
object of disposal rights comprises not only tangible property, but also bodiless non-material interests.③ Some
scholars expand the object scope of disposal rights to cover spiritual interests. That is, in addition to real rights
and intellectual property rights, right of personality shall also be included.④ I also hold the same opinion
that disposal rights shall include real rights, intellectual property rights and the right of personality. Finally,
absolute rights are in nature a disposal rights, but disposal rights are not totally equivalent to absolute rights
which are wider in scope.⑤ The dominant trait of absolute rights is undeniable, and all absolute rights can
dominate interests. The dominant trait of absolute rights is manifested as selection and decision of property
interests under the obligee’s control of will. Take copyright as an example. A copyright owner can exercise
various powers and functions under its control of will, such as authorship, publication, modification and
transfer. The selection and decision of copyright interests are realized through the will of the copyright owner.
But this reason is not enough for defining copyright as a real right. Copyright can only be deemed as an

①
②
③
④
⑤
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absolute right in such a case. Even if virtual property right possesses such core features that an obligee has the
decision-making power over it and can ultimately control and decide its future and destiny, this can only prove
that virtual property rights are disposal rights and cannot be logically inferred as a real right.
2.2 The “theory of virtual property as a real right” under the approach of consequentialism has
resulted from adhering to the dichotomy system of property rights comprising real rights and creditor’s
rights.
Some scholars have brought up the thinking approach of consequentialism, holding the opinion that
the legal position of virtual property rights has always swung between real rights and creditor’s rights,
and this is supposed to change the viewing angle and define the nature of virtual property rights from the
perspective of consequentialism.① Consequentialism is a concept corresponding to essentialism. Traditional
essentialism bases itself on the idea that every entity must have several decisive traits, while consequentialism
is a theoretical attitude making a judgment by means of facts and consequences, instead of concepts and
general principles. Applying such an attitude to the legal practice means that legislators or judiciaries shall be
responsible for the consequences of their activities, or at least those to be achieved intentionally or with deep
consideration.② With different schemes in view, it is supposed to choose the one most conductive to society.
The three major criteria proposed by German scholar Deckert, namely, efficiency, justice and truth, shall be
adopted in selection. Different fields may emphasize different selection criteria, e.g., civil law emphasizes
efficiency while public law emphasizes justice. The consequentialists use the economic analysis of laws to
study the dispute types through specific cases. The conclusion drawn after analysis is that defining network
virtual property as a real right is better than defining it as a creditor’s right in consequences.③
This demonstration does develop a new and unique method, and the selected cases also seem relatively
persuasive, but it is still problematic in logic.
Such an argument is built on the premise that the nature of virtual property rights is either real rights or
creditor’s rights, but the nature of property rights can be identified as more than two forms. Theories like “new
rights theory” and “intellectual property rights theory” are not baseless. The demonstration is not precise
unless there is evidence that defining virtual property rights as a real right is superior to other right forms (such
as creditor’s rights, intangible property rights, and new property rights). “The dichotomy system of property
rights comprising real rights and creditor’s rights originated at the beginning of the Renaissance and took
root in the industrial revolution. The virtual property issue emerging in the network era extends far beyond
the range of the system.”④ It is better to purge the restraints of Pandekten’s dichotomy property rights system,
consider the nature of virtual property rights with an open mind, and leave virtual property a wider legal space
for development, than to narrowly interpret virtual property rights as a real right, leading to various theoretical
exceptions.
The second problem is that such conclusion compares obligatory claims with real rights claims and real
rights damage claims, arguing that the effect of exercising real rights is superior to that of exercising creditor’s
rights. However, the problem is that the strong effect of real rights is relative to creditor’s rights. If virtual
①
②
③
④

Xu, 2016
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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property rights are defined as another rights form, their effect will not necessarily be weaker than the real
rights and might even be stronger. The strong effect of real rights stems from its exclusive effect as an absolute
right, and the absolute rights in civil law are not limited to real rights. Taking intellectual property rights as an
example, such rights also possess strong erga omnes as an absolute right, and claim effects such as stopping
infringements, removing obstacles, eliminating dangers and compensating for losses. If defined as a property
right with erga omnes effect, virtual property rights can also have the above strong ergaomnes effects and
effects better than creditor’s rights. Therefore, it is not that the effect of real rights precedes creditor’s rights,
but in essence that the effect of absolute rights precedes that of relative rights.
The last point is that such a conclusion is only focused on the strong effect of real rights, without
considering the overall system design after defining virtual property rights as a real right. The
consequentialists themselves also believe that, “The legal orientation of network virtual property just marks
the beginning of the study, and addressing such difficulties as the content, publication and transference of
the rights still relies on the accumulation of more cases and the inspection of the consequences in detail.
So, we still have a long way ahead.”① The effect of real rights is truly strong, but virtual property rights are
significantly different from the traditional real rights in terms of content, publication method and transference,
so it is logically unreasonable to equate these two quite different rights.

3. Criticism on the “theory of virtual property as a creditor’s right” under the
protection of the “rights paradigm”
3.1 Negation of the “theory of virtual property as a creditor’s right” from the perspective of larceny
in Criminal Law
Virtual property has already extended beyond the boundary of civil law and made its presence in criminal
law, administrative law and other fields. In recent years, there have been many discussions in criminal law
field regarding whether stealing virtual property constitutes larceny. Criminal Law scholars focus their
debates on what the nature of virtual property is. It is widely accepted by criminal law scholars that the object
of larceny is property, and if virtual property is not property, such behavior shall not be defined as larceny.
This shows that how the nature of virtual property is defined by civil law will directly influence criminal
judgments. Although criminal law scholars have often discussed the act of stealing IOUs or debt notes
which is considered by some scholars as larceny,② it is noteworthy that IOUs or debt notes are in nature just
certificates of creditor's rights which can only prove the possible debtor-creditor relationship. The certificates
of creditor’s rights such as IOUs or debt notes can be stolen, but creditor’s rights cannot. If virtual property
rights are identified as a creditor's right, then there is no such problem as whether stealing virtual property
constitutes larceny.
Zhang Mingkai holds that, “It is not necessary to define the concept of virtual property, but just judge
whether the virtual property infringed by the perpetrator can possibly be managed, transferred or valued.
If yes, it shall be identified as property; otherwise, even if widely recognized as virtual property, it shall not

① Ibid.
② Li, 2013
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be identified as property in criminal law.”① The management possibility refers to whether virtual property
can be dominated and controlled; the transference possibility refers to whether virtual property can be
transferred to a different account; the value refers to whether virtual property has a market value. Virtual
property in possession of these three features can be judged as the property prescribed in criminal law, which
can constitute the object of larceny. To declare guilty and punish crimes, criminal law just needs to define its
nature as property rather than to describe what nature the property is.
3.2 Negation of the “theory of virtual property as a creditor’s right” from the perspective of larceny
in insurance law
Law, based on bounded rationality and procedural justice, always lags the market. Virtual property is not
systematically prescribed by law, but its great value has already been affirmed by the market. The launch of
virtual property insurance proves the strength of the virtual economy and its nature as not being a creditor's
right. Now virtual property insurance can be classified into two major categories: virtual property damage
insurance② and virtual property liability insurance. ③
The validation of virtual property liability insurance subject and calculation of insurance compensation
amounts indicate that virtual property’s value is independent of its generation basis, i.e., creditor’s rights.
The existence of virtual property liability insurance presupposes an onerous contract relationship between a
network service provider and a network user. The network service provider shall be liable for damages if the
network user is victimized by burglary of its virtual property due to the fault of the service provider. But the
network service provider can transfer the liability for damage to an insurer by purchasing virtual property
liability insurance. The compensation amount of virtual property insurance is calculated based on the virtual
property market value, not measured by the deal price agreed to by the network user and network service
provider. This proves that virtual property rights are not a creditor’s right, but a property right independent
of creditor’s rights. Creditor’s rights certainly possess property values and can be treated as a trading object
in modern market transactions, namely, disposed as assets. But with virtual property liability insurance,
the network service provider or network user does not propose to transfer the creditor’s right. Although the
virtual property liability insurance is created based on the contract between the network service provider and
the network user, the validation of the insurance subject and calculation of insurance compensation amounts
instead prove that the virtual property rights are property rights different from creditor’s rights.
Moreover, the subject of virtual property damage insurance is the loss of virtual property value, more
intuitively showing the independent value of virtual property. After the establishment of a contractual
① Zhang, 2015
② For example, China’s largest virtual goods trading platform 5173 joins hands with the People’s Insurance Company (Group) of China Limited (PICC) to
launch virtual property insurance services. This type of insurance was developed by PICC and sold on the 5173 platform in order to ensure the security of
virtual property trading among online game players. When users trade goods on 5173 platform, the buyer can choose the insurance options for the purchased
equipment; once the equipment is retrieved by the seller maliciously, PICC will fully indemnify the sufferer. (Zhang Zhouping, Growing Market of Virtual
Property Insurance. Faren Magazine, 2013, 8.) Taobao also launched Tencent game props insurance jointly with Ping An Insurance Company and the latter
provides equipment insurances services for X-game, an MMORPG under Tencent Games. The players can start Safe Box services to buy insurance at QQ
Insurance interface and the insurance takes effect on the day and remains valid for one month. Once the game equipment in the Safe Box is lost and cannot be
retrieved, the players can apply for at least “1 yuan premium, hundred times claim” to get cash compensation. Ping An Property Insurance Joins Hands with
Tencent to Launch China's First Virtual Property Insurance. Retrieved from:http://finance. qq.com/a/20130608/017487.htm.
③ For example, Sunshine Insurance launched damage liability insurance for online game operators and players with GAMEBAR. This insurance is a liability
insurance purchased by online game companies from the insurance company and the latter shall guarantee the interests of the former and online game players
as per the insurance contract. If players’ account data were stolen or lost due to the online game company’s fault in security assurance, the insurer shall assume
relevant responsibilities pursuant to the stipulations of the insurance contract. The First Listed Virtual Property Insurer in the World. Retrieved from: http://
m.dooland.comlindex.php? s=/artic1el idlI54577.htm1.
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relationship between the network service provider and the network user through a network service protocol,
the network user plays the game and accepts the services through an account, thereby accessing the virtual
property for value or for free. The time and money invested by the network user during the usage enable
virtual property to increase its existing market value or gain market value if it does not initially have any. It is
the value of virtual property that makes it the subject of virtual property damage insurance.
Finally, the coexistence of virtual property damage insurance and virtual property liability insurance
can further prove that virtual property is independent of network service protocols. For the same user’s
virtual property in insurance services, either the network service provider or the network user can buy virtual
property liability insurance from an insurer. This indicates that the network service provider does not have
the exclusive property rights over virtual property; otherwise, the provider will not allow the network user to
sign an insurance contract with the insurer. In turn, the reason why the network user can buy virtual property
damage insurance is that he has an exclusive property right over his virtual property.

4. Justification of virtual property rights as a new independent civil property right
4.1 Virtual property’s uniqueness is enough to make it the object of a new property right
Some scholars have opposed treating virtual property as the object of a new property right because the
“theory of virtual property as a new property right” overstates the uniqueness of virtual property, which is
considered not enough for separation from reality.① But scholars holding such an opinion also admit that,
“Network virtual property possesses an ‘intangibility’ similar to that of the object of intellectual property
rights, and also the form of protection similar to that of traditional property.”② Some scholars even argue
that virtual property rights are real rights turning to have the character of creditor’s rights.③ The legislative
body also fully recognizes the fact that virtual property is characterized differently from traditional real
rights and creditor’s rights. Sun Xianzhong who participated in the formulation of General Provisions of the
Civil Law believes that network virtual property shall not be fully defined as general property. The standard
of property value must be a social one universally accepted by society, but network virtual property still
cannot meet this requirement. As a result, he submitted it to the 5th Session of the 12th National People’s
Congress for modification of the original statement in the General Provisions of the Civil Law (draft) during
the deliberations.④ Any forced interpretation of virtual property rights as real rights or creditor’s rights may
face the theoretical issues and barriers for legal applicability, which are hard to explain. “In the face of the
constantly merging new property forms, we do not have to establish a new institutional system if the existing
legal system can be used to standardize them, so as to maintain legal stability.”⑤ Nevertheless, it is better to
face the particularity of virtual property rights and the fact of a booming virtual economy, and identify virtual
property rights as a new property right, i.e., “virtual property rights,” than to create too many exceptional
interpretations for adaption to the existing legal system, causing the existing rights system to fall apart and
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damage its internal logical structure, bringing impacts to the dichotomy system of real rights and creditor’s
rights. Wu Jingxiong once said: Law science and legislation are both of openness. For instance, we can
generally describe the 19th century as a century inclined to specialization. A variety of specialties developed
internally in their own way. This fashion certainly also affected law science.”① Facing such rights with
complicated and individualized content, we shall identify them as a new right and regulate them by a single
law, a way that can better accord with the continuously increasing amount of property and content of rights.
4.2 Intangible property rights as a superordinate theoretical concept cannot precisely reflect the
nature of virtual property rights.
Identifying virtual property as intangible property is also one of the opinions held by the theoretical circle,
but in my opinion, it has the following problems.
The first problem is that intangible property rights are not a standard concept of law, but a concept created
in theory and used to describe the rights related to intangibles or tangibles. Intangible property rights exist
only as a descriptive or theoretical concept but identifying an emerging right as an intangible property right is
actually nothing more than describing the features of such a right, instead of revealing its essence.
The second problem is that “there are a wide variety of intangible property rights which further consist
of countless subtypes. It is difficult to find common rules even within the same intangible property right.
Therefore, from the perspective of overall intangible property rights, the content of property rights vary
greatly.”② The three typical intellectual property rights considered as intangible property rights, i.e., copyright,
patent right and trademark right, can hardly be unified and standardized in one code due to their unique
rules, so a single law shall be formulated for each of them. On the premise that unified rules have not yet
been formed for the internal rights of intellectual property rights, and the nature of virtual property as an
intellectual property right is denied, identifying its nature as an intangible property right is just an objective
description, without any benefits.
The third problem is that the concept of intangible property rights is just a theoretical generalization,
which is irrelevant to the legislative models of intangible property rights. Although in some countries, general
provisions of property rights are stipulated in the Civil Code, the property concept always includes movable
or immovable property.③ The discussion of the attribute of virtual property rights as an intangible property
right without legislative precedents does not have the foundation of comparative law. For now, at least, it is still
impossible for China’s legislation to give up the existing tangible property rights system, and in turn adopt a
greater property rights system to cover intangible property rights.
4.3 The high legislation cost cannot fully justify the negation of independent virtual property rights.
One of the reasons for negating the attribute of virtual property rights as a new property right is that,
“The legislation cost for establishing a complete set of new property protections system is too high; if without
such a protection system, this theory then turns into a ‘depicted cake’ that looks tasty but cannot really fill the
stomach.”④ Such an opinion just mentions the high legislation cost in a general way, but does not analyze what

① Wu, 2005
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④ Tang, 2015
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kind of legislation cost is high and why it is so high. The so-called legislation cost refers to the cost-benefit
analysis of legislation, namely, calculating the legislation cost and benefits, analyzing them by the benefitcost-difference method and benefit-cost-ratio method, and finally deciding whether legislation is necessary
and which legislation is the best option.① But from the perspective of legislation cost for virtual property, such
an opinion has some problems. The first is that there is no independent agency in China that can uniformly
inspect and coordinate the cost-benefit analysis of legislation. Without such agencies to analyze the legislation
cost and benefit of virtual property, it is certainly impossible to draw a conclusion stating that the legislation
cost of virtual property is too high. The second problem is that even if the cost-benefit analysis of legislation
is conducted by a private organization, the conditions for accessing analytical data are not available. The costbenefit analysis of legislation needs plenty of data, requiring the collection of complete information. Presently,
there is no collection, analysis and comparison of data for virtual property in China and no one has ever
conducted an analysis of legislation cost for virtual property. The last problem is that a “cost-benefit analysis
is not fit for all legislations.”② The cost-benefit analysis of legislation itself also incurs cost, and the collection
and statistics of relevant data are almost an impossible mission due to virtual property’s oversized scope. The
tremendous cost for cost-benefit analysis of legislation determines that it is unfit to conduct such analysis for
virtual property.
On the contrary, viewed from the legislative attitude of the General Provisions of the Civil Law towards
virtual property, there is no need to consider legislation cost if virtual property is identified as virtual property
rights. The General Provisions of the Civil Law generally stipulates that virtual property shall be protected by
law, with no specific provisions on the nature and concrete protective methods of virtual property, and relative
laws shall be referred to as to its concrete protective methods. So far, the civil legislation of virtual property is
still inadequate; the concrete protection of virtual property will certainly be detailed in a single law. Therefore,
no matter which rights it is identified as the cost for secondary legislation is inevitable. If the attributes of the
rights for virtual property are identified as real rights or creditor’s rights in legislation, there will definitely be
many exceptions deviating from the rules of traditional real rights or creditor’s rights, such as limitations on
disposal rights, special ways of publication and other regulations. This case will in turn affect the legislation
quality. Low legislation quality will be the biggest waste of legislation cost. Therefore, the most objective way
of thinking towards legislation cost is to face the true nature of virtual property, and not to include it into any
existing rights with similarities but also large differences.
4.4 The relational structure of Civil Law and Intellectual Property Law provides an example for the
independent legislative model of virtual property.
“Due to the tradition of codification since Roman law and the inability of legislative techniques,
intellectual property has never been able to appear in the modern society’s civil code with paradigms as a
systematic rights system.”③ Intellectual property rights face no pressure under the broad concept of “property”
in the Anglo-American Legal System, but there is a predicament about how to enter the Continental Legal
System. Both French Civil Code and German Civil Code based on the Roman legal system follow the beaten

① Liu & Jin, 2016
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track of treating property as an object and thereby establish a real rights system of ownership, from which a
dichotomy system of property rights comprising real rights and creditor’s rights is formed. The impregnable
Pandekten system keeps to the existing rights system too firmly to let in new rights. Whereupon jurists
have been compelled to use the legal concepts such as “creditor’s rights turning to have the character of
real rights,” “real rights turning to have the character of creditor’s rights” and “quasi-real rights,” trying to
make a connection with real rights or creditor’s rights and gain favor from the traditional civil rights system
that can provide legal protections and remedies. But the above methods can hardly apply to and explain
intellectual property rights, because the corporeality of object of real rights as a precondition has directly
excluded intellectual property rights. Despite their many features in comparison with traditional private rights,
such as mingling with attributes of public law, more procedural provisions, and strong regulatory character,
intellectual property rights are still identified as private rights overall. In terms of legal applicability, the
application of basic principles in civil law face no pressures. “The compilation of modern civil code is an
important way to realize legal modernization. The intellectual property law having undergone systematic and
modern transformations is ‘incorporated into the Civil Code’ becoming a historical coordinate of the civil
code with ‘paradigms’.”① “Making a connection between intellectual property law and Civil Code, namely,
making an institutional arrangement of intellectual property rights in the civil rights framework of Civil
Code is an issue about intellectual property law being ‘incorporated into the Civil Code’.”② There are three
specific modes, i.e., take-in type, blending type and linking type. In Chapter 5 of “Civil Rights” in General
Provisions of the Civil Law of China, a special section is arranged to prescribe intellectual property rights,
setting principles for copyright, patent right, trademark right and right of inventions, which is a typical linkingtype legislative model. In the compilation of the Civil Code, the Chinese legislators still follow the existing
linking-type legislative model of intellectual property rights in the General Principles of the Civil Law. The
generalized provisions on intellectual property rights in Article No. 123, Chapter 5 “Civil Rights” in General
Provisions of the Civil Law inherit the linking-type legislative model which has proved to be successful in
the 30-year practices of the General Principles of the Civil Law. While maintaining the stability of the code,
the legislators allocate a position to intellectual property rights in the civil rights system through linked
clauses, successfully incorporating intellectual property rights into the traditional civil rights system, so that
the essence of intellectual property rights as being protected by private law is affirmed in legislation. This
no doubt provides a definite legal basis for principal theory and system of civil law in the field of intellectual
property rights.
Creditor’s rights and real rights are the reflection of relative rights and absolute rights in the field of
property rights. The intervention of intellectual property rights has not exerted a destructive effect on the
property rights system. In the new property rights system, intellectual property rights coexist harmoniously
with real rights and creditor’s rights, enriching the property rights system and also providing a successful
example for the introduction of virtual property rights. The advanced experience of linking-type legislation
for intellectual property rights in the General Principles of the Civil Law of China has been used for the
legislation of virtual property. In view of its features, the unique legal protection rules of virtual property shall
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be standardized in the form of a single law, just like the rules of intellectual property rights.

5. Analysis of the legislative frame of virtual property rights
5.1 Subject of virtual property rights
William Blackstone once said, “There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages
the affections of mankind, as the right of property”.① In modern society, the values of intellectual products
and virtual property are enough to rival all property. The booming intellectual property system is exactly the
fruitful results obtained under the protection of the property rights system. It might be more appropriate to turn
the above quotation into, “There is no legal system which inspires the enthusiasm for creation of mankind, as
the right of property.” For the virtual property formed through the network coding design input by network
service providers, it is supposed to endow the virtual property with virtual property rights by following John
Locke’s Productive Labor theory, i.e., network service providers are the original subject of virtual property
rights. Developers input massive manpower, materials and finances during the development of network virtual
property and are justified to own the property rights.② Even though virtual property does not enter the trading
market, its usage value and exchange value shall not be denied.
After virtual products are put on the market by network service providers, network users obtain the
virtual property rights through derivative acquisition. Network users cannot acquire virtual property rights in
the original way, because they cannot develop network code and provide network services.” “Property rights
might be the best way used in which to ensure that individuals devote sufficient resources to the creation of
abstract objects.”③ After acquiring virtual property rights through market conduct, network users can achieve
preservation or appreciation of virtual property through their own maintenance and operation of the property.
If not endowed with property rights, network users will not be motivated and encouraged to maintain and
operate the property with best efforts, just as a legal proverb goes, “One shall have his peace of mind when he
possesses a piece of land.”
“Rights shall have their own subject(s), but it is not necessary to specify whether subject(s) is in singular or
plural form(s).”④ Virtual property rights as a category of property rights can be shared by several persons and
established to be a quasi co-ownership on its nature, i.e., “the so-called property rights except the proprietary
rights co-owned separately or in common by several persons.”⑤ In terms of legal applications, special law
shall prevail if any provision is given therein. If no special law is formulated, provisions on co-ownership are
applicable to the quasi co-ownership of virtual property. Assume that two or more subjects jointly open an
online store and do not involve any common relations like family relationships, then it is in nature a store quasi
co-owned by shares. If one of the subjects intends to sell its shares, the provisions on preemptive rights of coowners by shares shall be applied and other co-owners shall be given priority in obtaining the online store’s
shares. In general, it is necessary to consider the particularity of quasi co-ownership of virtual property when
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applicable to co-ownership rules. If virtual property cannot be applicable to any division mode of common
property, then only division by pricing is of practical significance.
5.2 Object of virtual property rights
As mentioned above, the independence of the “rights paradigm” protection path on the object of virtual
property rights is exactly the key point criticized by the “relationships paradigm” protection path.① In my
opinion, the object has always been favored more theoretically by theorists, but the identification of the object
does not help the resolution of practical problems. That is why the General Provisions of the Civil Law does
not prescribe the object of virtual property rights. But if it is imperative to describe the object of virtual
property rights, then I am prone to identify the object of rights as interests, through which it is able to be
adapted to and cope with the abnormal phenomenon of identifying an object per type of rights in previous
theoretical disputes, and differentiate the two concepts, i.e., object of legal relations and that of rights.
5.3 Exercise and protection of virtual property rights
Virtual property rights remain valid for a period of time and available during the provision of services by
network service providers but are not permanent. During the validity of virtual property rights, the obligee is
entitled to use, reap and dispose the properties. Network service protocol cannot restrict the disposal of virtual
property rights in such ways as transfer, inheritance and division.
“The owner of any rights certainly can exercise his rights for his own interests, but on one condition that
his interests shall never confront social interests. An individual is no more than a social cell and must not
go beyond the spirit of the system, which is nothing else but creating his own rights by himself, the abuse of
rights.”② The principle of not abusing rights also governs virtual property. Since virtual property exists in
cyberspace, where someone can abuse rights simply by moving the mouse and causing damage to others’
and to social interests, it is easier for people to abuse rights at a low cost. The criminal offenses by the use
of networks such as gambling and obscenities overstep the limit of the obligee’s virtual property rights. It is
prescribed in Article 132 of the General Provisions of the Civil Law that the civil subjects shall not abuse the
civil rights and damage the national interests, the social public interests or the legitimate rights and interests of
others. The principle of prohibiting rights abuse prescribed in the article also governs virtual property rights.
Virtual property rights shall be defined as absolute rights in nature, from which the right of absolute claim
arises, i.e., the obligee of virtual property rights can exercise the right of claim such as return of properties,
abatement of nuisance and elimination of dangers. Virtual property does not possess the corporeality of
property, so its infringement by others is mainly manifested as the obligee’s changed account and password
that can disable the obligee ability to login to the account. So, to exercise the right of claim for return of
properties, the only way is to request the infringer to notify the new account and password, so as to recover the
quasi-possession of the virtual property. Upon the exercise of the right of claim for abatement of nuisance and
elimination of dangers, virtual property rights show no particularity.
When virtual property damages are caused by other’s infringement, it is supposed to claim for different
compensations for the damages according to the categories of virtual property. Depending on the differences
in content, virtual property can be classified into property-interest virtual property and personality-interest
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virtual property. The property-interest virtual property, such as game equipment, the account and password
registered at an online store, refers to the virtual property that can bring economic interests. The personalityinterest virtual property, such as pure network photos, net mail, microblog accounts and passwords, refers to the
virtual property with little or no economic value, but more reflecting personality interests.① For the infringement
of property-interest virtual property, it should be undoubtedly for the obligee to claim for property damage
compensation, with the market value or estimated value as the reference factor for determining the amount of
indemnity. There are different views in the academic circle on whether the infringement of personality-interest
virtual property can claim for spiritual damage compensation. There is an opinion that the applicable objects
of spiritual damage compensation shall be confined to virtual subjects and characters, and the legal personality
of personality-interest virtual property has not yet been accepted academically, so compensation shall not be
granted.② Another opinion is that the affection online game players attach to the virtual items shall be used to
justify the necessity of spiritual damage compensation.③ Both opinions contain some defects. The first is that
plentiful virtual property varieties are overlooked when virtual property is confined to virtual characters in online
games, from which a unilateral conclusion is drawn on whether compensation shall be granted. The second is that
the judgment on whether a spiritual damage exists is suspected of substituting personal subjective standards for
the “generally reasonable person” standard. Regarding this issue, it is supposed to follow the logic of the current
spiritual damage compensation system and judge on the basis of whether such virtual property has a symbolic
meaning of personality, such as an E-mail address or microblog account storing some memorable letters, photos
and articles. Subjective feeling shall not be used as the standard for paying spiritual damage compensation. My
opinions have been supported in judicial cases. For instance, in the Dispute over a Contract on Entertainment
Services in the Case of Li Hongchen v. Beijing Beijibin Technology Development Co., Ltd., ④ the prosecutor
claimed that he had devoted a lot of energy and affection to playing the game for two years, and the defendant’s
deletion of items has given him a severe mental blow, so he requested a spiritual damage compensation amounting
to RMB 10,000. The court did not support the request for spiritual damage compensation on the grounds that
the deleted items did not have a legitimate value in themselves. Another noteworthy point is that because of its
network coding features, if the virtual property, though deleted by network service providers or infringed by
others, can be restored via recovery codes, then discretionary consideration shall be given in terms of economic
and spiritual damage compensation. If property-interest virtual property is restored through the network service
providers’ technical means, then only the losses indirectly caused there from shall be compensated for, such as
operating losses, necessary litigation costs and others. If personality-interest virtual property is restored through
the network service providers’ technical means, then a spiritual damage is still possible. In such a case, the amount
of compensation shall be reduced accordingly, and the calculation shall not be conducted as if virtual property was
completely lost, and meanwhile consideration shall be given to the necessary litigation costs and other property
losses.
5.4 Publication of virtual property rights
Virtual property rights are in nature an absolute right, instead of a relative right, so their publication is
①
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necessary to set a space for others’ freedom to act. Some scholars believe that, “Publication is the source of the
absolute effect of rights. To empower rights with a binding effect on others, it is imperative to let rights into
the publication field.”① The attribute of virtual property as an absolute right just determines that it is possible
to publish virtual property rights. The publication of rights not just aims at the right in rem. The necessity of
publishing a right hinges on whether it might be infringed by others. The process of virtual property arising
from custom and gradually entering the legal field as a new object of property rights is a process of virtual
property rights being infringed. And virtual property rights “as a property right not dominating property but
having actual dominance relations shall be protected by law without question.”② Virtual property rights can
be published in a quasi-possession way. It is prescribed in Item 1, Article 966 of the so-called “Civil Law”
in Taiwan, China, that, “A quasi-possessor is a person who exercises such property rights over a thing as are
established without having taken possession of the said thing.” It can be learned from such provision that
quasi-possession comprises the following three components: (1) treating property rights as a subject matter; (2)
being applicable to the property rights does not establish domination of the property; (3) exercising the right
in reality.③ As far as virtual property rights are concerned, although having the attribute of personality, some
virtual property rights are on the whole a property right, instead of a right of personality. And virtual property
differs from property because the former is not established for domination of physical objects. Finally, the
obligee exercises the rights over virtual property. The quasi-possessors’ requirements are nothing more than
dominating virtual property in reality. Therefore, adopting quasi-possession as the way of demonstration for
virtual property is completely fit for its own features. Moreover, considering the complicated varieties and
huge differences in the values of virtual property, it is suggested to directly eliminate registration as the way
of demonstration for cost purpose. Quasi-possession is externally manifested as the holding of account and
password. Users login the account via account name and password, representing quasi-possession externally.
5.5 Alteration of virtual property rights
Acquisition of virtual property comprises original acquisition and derivative acquisition. The original
acquisition of virtual property shall refer to the acquisition through labor, i.e., network service providers
generate property via source code design. After being put on the market, virtual property is acquired by a
successor through market transfer and the obligee of virtual property rights can transfer the virtual property
again. These two transfers, though both are disposals of virtual property rights, differ slightly in essentials of
establishment. The primary transfer is conducted by the network service provider to the vendee, i.e. the obligee
of virtual property rights, and both sides just need to enter a basic legal relationship, usually through a network
service protocol. The completion of registration directly results in the legal transfer of virtual property rights.
And the secondary transfer must be completed by informing the transferee of the account name and password,
i.e., external imagery of quasi-possession. Thus, the dual-alteration mode of virtual property shall be “basic
contractual relationship + quasi-possession.”
The issues about acquisition in good faith of virtual property rights may also emerge in a particular situation.
Though stemming from real rights, the acquisition-in-good-faith system is designed to protect good-willed
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traders, and therefore its range of application shall be extended to cover all the property rights conforming to the
requirements of publication. The attribute of virtual property as a right instead of a physical object determines that
virtual property rights may also face the problem of unauthorized disposal rights acquired in good faith by a third
party. Although Article 106 of Property Law of China confines the applicable objects of acquisition in good faith
to real rights, the acquisition in good faith of stock rights provides that of virtual property rights with legislative
and judicial experiences as guidance. It is clearly prescribed in Articles 7, 26 and 28 of Provisions of the Supreme
People’s Court on Some Issues about the Application of the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (III)
(hereinafter referred to as Interpretation of Company Law (III)) that the provisions on acquisition in good faith in
Article 106 of Property Law can serve as a reference to unauthorized disposal rights. In concrete application, the
acquisition in good faith of virtual property rights shall involve the three cases below. The first case is that, if one
account is registered by several persons who shall form a quasi-common relationship over the virtual property per
a protocol, and if one of them disposes of the virtual property rights without other co-owners’ permission, then
unauthorized disposal rights is constituted and further acquired in good faith by a third party.① The second case is
that, it is prescribed in Article 26 of Interpretation of Company Law (III) that acquisition in good faith shall apply
to the case in which significant shareholders dispose of the property of dormant partners. This provision can also
be consulted for virtual property. If the real obligee registers Taobao stores or WeChat business accounts in the
name of others for the sake of his status as a public servant, and the nominal obligee of virtual property rights later
transfers the Taobao stores or WeChat business accounts to a third party, then the good-willed vendee’s interests
shall be protected through the application of the acquisition-in-good-faith system. The last case is that a game
account might be lent out. If the borrower sells the account to other uninformed players in his name, then it is
possible to apply acquisition in good faith to unauthorized disposal rights.
Virtual property can also be inherited, leading to the intergenerational transference of virtual property.②
Since virtual property is based on the Internet, accounts and passwords are necessary to the exercise of rights;
with the object of rights attached to no physical object, anyone who has the accounts and passwords can
control the virtual property online. Above features determine that if virtual property does not involve with
property in terms of inheritance, then it is of personality-interest virtual property, and multi-person inheritance
shall be possible, without division of the shares involved.
The division of virtual property rights might also be possible. If it is personality-interest virtual property
which does not involve property interests and might be accessed by several persons via accounts and
passwords just like that with inheritance, then the division issue does not exist. If it is of property-interest
virtual property such as an online store and WeChat merchant account, then the division issue does exist. In
respect to the division method, priority shall be given to the method that after bilateral consultation, one side
acquires the virtual property rights and compensates the other side for the loss by payment. If both sides claim
for the virtual property rights, then the attribution of the rights shall be decided through bidding.
Many factors can result in the eradication of virtual property rights and are directly related to the features
of virtual property. In real life, virtual property rights can be eradicated for many reasons. The specific
situations defy enumeration but contain the following cases. (1) Abandonment. Any right could be abandoned,
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and virtual property rights are not an exception. For example, a registered E-mail account is abandoned, and
other registered E-mail addresses are used instead. (2) Termination of services by network service providers.
The existence and validity of virtual property rights are based on the premise of the services provided by
network service providers. If network service providers terminate the network services due to operational
transformation, business failures and dissolution, then virtual property rights shall be eradicated with the loss
of cyberspace they depended on. It is well known that Yahoo Inc. called off its mail product due to the failed
localization in China, many Yahoo Mail users’ virtual property rights over the mail were eradicated with the
termination of the network services. (3) Expiration of agreed duration. Network service providers and network
users might set a duration for a specific network service; if the service duration expires, the virtual property
rights obtained during the duration shall therefore be eradicated.
5.6 Legislative model of virtual property rights
The legislative model of single law for intellectual property rights has been proved to be a success after
years of practice, while that of virtual property rights shall be the direction for legislators to work on in future.
Even after the introduction of Civil Code, it is still necessary to adopt the legislative model of single law in
order to meet the demands for rapid development of virtual property rights in the network era. The legislative
model of database shall serve as a reference for the legislation of virtual property rights. For the protection
mode of database, the debate among protection modes of copyright, anti-unfair competition, contracting,
technical measures and special rights has always been there. The Directive 96/9/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases (hereinafter referred to as
“E.U.’s Database Directive”) went into force in 1996, adopting the mode of special rights to protect databases.
Germany and the UK have successively modified or formulated special provisions or laws on database
protection. Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996 (also known as H.R. 3531)
of U.S. and the WIPO Draft Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Databases are also the protection
acts treating database as special rights and formulated on the basis of the EUs Directive.① The separate
legislation model for protection of special rights suits the needs of unique rights content and relief methods for
databases, and avoids confusion in interpretations arising from copyright, contracting and other comparable
protection modes. In this regard, virtual property and databases bear resemblance. Virtual property has once
been defined as various property rights, as a result of compromises reached through various legal fictions or
analogies by sacrificing or overlooking the uniqueness of virtual property. In comparison, the legislative model
of single law shall be adopted for virtual property rights. In future Civil Code, virtual property rights shall be
prescribed in the “Rights” chapter of the General Provisions of the Civil Law as an independent property right.
As for ordinal position, it is suggested to put virtual property rights behind stock rights and other investment
rights, and stipulate that civil subjects legally enjoy network virtual property rights. This provision can then
be followed by the catch-all provision, i.e., Article No. 126 of the General Provisions of the Civil Law, reading,
“The civil subjects enjoy other civil rights and interests as prescribed by law,” so that virtual property rights
can truly become a member of the civil rights system. After the establishment of virtual property rights as an
independent property right in the Civil Code, it is important to timely formulate Virtual Property Law, making
systematic designs and arrangements for their special provisions.
① Huang, 2007
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